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the prize court of the German Empire has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the fate of the Appam as la,vful
prize. ~,he vessel 'vas in an . A.merican port, and, under
our practice, 'vithin the jurisdiction and possession of the
district court, 'vhich had assumed to determine the
alleged violation of neutral rights, 'vith power to dispose
of the vessel accordingly. 'The foreign tribunal, under
such circumstances, could not oust the jurisdiction of the
local court and thereby defeat its judgment. (The
Santissima Trinidad, supra, p. 355.)
Were the rule otherwise than this court has frequently
declared it to be, our ports might be filled, in case of a
general war such as is now in progress bet,veen the
European countries, with captured prizes of one or the
other of the belligerents, in utter violation of the principles of neutral obligation 'vhich have controlled this
country from the beginning.
The violation of American neutrality is the basis of
jurisdiction, and the admiralty courts may order restitution for a violation of such neutrality. In each case the
jurisdiction and order rests upon the authority of the
courts of the United States to make restitution to private
owners for violations of neutrality 'vhere offending vessels
are within our jurisdiction, thus vindicating our rights
and obligations as a neutral people.
It follo\\TS that the decree in each case must be affirmed.
[1918]

THE "HAKAN."
[PRIVY CouNCIL.]
ON APPEAL FROl\I THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.
October 16, 1917.
{1918] A. C. 148.

Appeal fron1 a judgment of the president of the prohate, divorce, and admiralty division (in prize), delivered on July 3, 1916. 55
The appellants, a Swedish firm carrying on business
at Gothenburg, were the owners of the steamship Hakan,
which was condemned by a judgment of the president
(Sir Samuel Evans) on the ground that she was
captured while carrying a contraband cargo.
The facts appear from the judgment of their lordships.
li5

(1916] p. 266.
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'fhe learned president held that, apart from the provisions of article 40 of the declaration of London, 1909,
the action and the views expressed by the chief maritime
States before and since the international naval conference
of 1908-9 justified the prize court in accepting as part
of the law of nations the rule, stated in article 40, that
' 'a vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the
contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume,
or freight, forms more than half the cargo." He considered that \vhere the contraband being carried exceeded the above stated proportion it w:as not necessary
to prove knowledge on the part of the owner or master 1
that the goods in question \Vere destined for the enemy.
He held that the owner, or the 1naster on his behalf, must
,. be taken to know the nature a.nd destination of the cargo.
Upon the facts of the present case, ho·w·ever, he found
that the ship having been chartered at a freight representing 200 per cent per annum upon her capital or insurable
value there could be no doubt that the o'\vners knew
that she "'as to be employed in the contraband trade
between Scandinavia and German Baltic ports. The
Hakan accordingly was condemned.
October 16. The judgment of their lordships was r.ase.
Statement oflho
delivered by Lord Parker, of Waddington. The Swedish
steamship Hak·an, the subject of this appeal, '\vas captured at sea by H. M. S. Nonsuch on April 4, 1916, having
sailed the same day from Haugesund, in N or1vay, on a
voyage to Lubeck, in Germany, with a cargo of salted
herrings. Foodstuffs had as early as August 4, 1914,
been declared to be conditional contraband.
The writ
in the present proceedings claimed condemnation of both
ship and cargo, the former on the ground that it \Vas
carrying contraband goods and the latter on the ground
that it consisted of contraband goods.
It should be observed that the cargo, being on a neutral
ship, '\vas, even if it belonged to enemies, exempt from
capture unless it consisted of contraband goods (see the
declaration of Paris) .
The cargo o"~ners did not appear or make any claim in
the action, although, according to the usual practice of
the prize court, even enemies may appear and be heard
in defense of their rights under an international agreement. The question \vhether the goods \Yere contraband
\Yas, ho"rever, fully argued by counsel for the O\vners of
the ship, a Svvedish firm carrying on business at Gothen-
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burg. The president condemned the cargo as contraband. I-Ie also condemned the ship for carrying contraband. 'fhc o\vners of theship have now appealed to
liis Majesty in council. Under these circumstances the
first question to be decided is ·w·hether the cargo was rightly
condemned as contraband, for if it was not there could
be no case against the ship.
co~t~~b~~~~ onal In their lordships' opinion, goods which are conditional
contraband can be properly condemned \vhenever the
court is of opinion, under all the circumstances brought
to its knowledge, that they were probably intended to be
applied for warlike purposes, the J onge Margaretha. 56
Presumptio?
of The fact alone that the oO"Oods in question are on the wav
enemy
destma...
'ion.
to an enemy base of naval or military equipment or
supply \vould justify an inference as to their probable
application for warlike purposes. But the character of
the place of destination is not the only circumstance
from which this inference can be drawn. All the known
facts have to be taken into account. The fact that the
goods are consigned to the enemy government, and not
to a private individual, \vould be material. The.
same would be the case if, though the goods are consigned to a private individual, such individual is in substance or in fact the agent or representative of the
enemy government.
In the present case Lubeck, the port of destination of
the goods, is undoubtedly a port used largely for the
importation into Germany of goods from Nor\vay and
Sweden; but it does not appear whether it is used
exclusively or at all as a base of naval or military equipment.
On the other hand, it is quite certain that the
persons to \vhom the goods ,.vere consigned at Lubeck
were bound forthwith to hand them over to the Central
Purchasing Co., of Berlin, a company appointed by the
German Government to act under the direction of the
imperial chancellor for purposes connected \vith the control of the food supplies rendered necessary by the \var.
The proper inference seems to be that the goods in
question are in effect goods requisitioned by the Government for the purposes of the \Var. It may be quite true
that their ultimate application, had they escaped capture,
\Vould have been to feed civilians, and not the naval or
military forces of Ger1nany; but the general scarcity of
food in Germany had 1nade the victualing of the civil
s&l C. Rob. 189.
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population a 'var problem. Even if the military or naval
forces of Ger1nany are never supplied with salted herrings,
their rations of bread or meat may 'vell be increased by
reason of the possibility of supplJing sal ted herrings to
the civil population.
Underj~these circumstances, the
inference is almost irresistible that the goods 'vere
intended to be applied for warlike purposes, and, this
being so, their lordships are of opinion that the goods
were rightly condemned.
The second question their lordships have to determine
relates to the condemnation of the ship for c~rrying the
goods in question. It is, of course, quite clear that if
.
57
article 40 of the declaration of London be applicable, L~~~~~atlOn ot
the ship was rightly condemned, inasmuch as the whole
cargo was contraband. The declaration of London has,
however, no validity as an international agreement. It
was, it is true, provided by the order in council of Octo-:
her 29, 1914, that during the present hostilities its provisions should, with certain very material modifications,
be adopted and put in force. But the prize court can
not, in deciding questions bet,veen His Majesty's Government and neutrals, act upon this order except in so
far as the declaration of London, as modified by the
order, either embodies the international law or contains
a waiver in favor o(~neutrals of the strict rights of the
Crown. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the international law with regard to the condemnation of a ship
for carrying contraband apart from the declaration of
London.
' It seems quite~clear that at one time in our history the
mere fact thati a neutral ship was carrying contraband
was considered to justify its condemnation, but this rule stowell's opinwas subsequently modified. Lord Stowell deals with the ion.
matter in the Neu-tralitet: 58 ''The modern rule of the law
of nations is, certainly," he says, ''that the ship shall not
be subject to condemnation for carrying contraband articles. The ancient practice was otherw·ise; and it can not
be denied, that it was perfectly defensible on every principle of justice. If to supply the enemy 'vith such articles
is a noxious act with respect to the O"\Vner of the cargo,
the vehicle which is instrumental in effecting that illegal
purpose can not be innocent. The policy of modern times
- - - - ------- - 67 Art. 40: "A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband,
reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or f~·eight, forms more than half the cargo."
~ (1801) 3 C. Rob. 295.
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has, however, introduced a relaxation on this point; and
the general rule now is, that the vessel does not become
confiscable for that act. But this rule is liable to exceptions-where a ship belongs to the ow·ner of the cargo,
or where the ship is going on such service, under a false
destination or false papers; these circumstances of aggravation have been held to constitute excepted cases out
of the n1odern rule, and to continue them under the
ancient one.''
It is to be observed that Lord Sto'-""ell does not say
that the particular cases he refers to are the only exceptions to the modern rule. On the contrary, his actual
decision in the Neutralitet 59 creates a third exception. It
should be observed, too, that in a later part of his judgment he states the reason for the modification of the
ancient rule to be the supposition that noxious or doubtful articles might be carried 'vithout the personal kno,vledge of the owner of the ship. l-Ie held in the case before
him that this ground for the n1odification of the rule
entirely failed, so that the ancient rule applied. The
reasoning is sound. For if the ancient rule 'vas modified
because of the possible 'vant of kno,vledge on the part of
the shipo,vner, it is perfectly logical to treat actual kno,vledge on the part of the shipo,vner as a good ground for
excepting any particular case fro1n the modern rule.
Knowledge 'viii also explain the t'vo 1nain exceptions to
which Lord Stowell refers. If the shipuwner also o'vns
the contraband cargo, he must have this knowledge;
and if he sails under a false destination or with false
papers, it is quite legitnnate to infer this knowledge
from his conduct. In his earlier decision in the Ringende Jacob 60 Lord Sto,vell had stated the modern rule
to be that the carrying of contraband is attended
only with loss of freight and expenses, except where
the ship belongs to the o'vner of the contraba.nd cargo
or 'vhere the simple misconduct of carrying a contraband cargo has been connected with other malignant
and aggravating circumstances. If by malignant and
aggravating circumstances Lord Sto,vell 1neant only circumstances from 'vhich kno,vledge of the character of the
ca.rgo 1night be properly inferred, the rule thus stated
does not differ from that laid do,vn in the subsequent
case of the Neutralitet. 59 But the 'vords used have by
li9

3 C. Rob. 295.
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(1798) 1 C. Rob. 89.
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son1e '\Vriters been taken as indicating that, in Lord Sto"rell's opinion, besides knowledge of the character of the
cargo, there must be on the part of the shipo'\vner some
intention or conduct to \vhich the epithets "malignant
or aggravating" can be applied in a real as opposed to a
rhetorical sense. Any such hypothesis seen1s, however,
to vitiate the reasoning of Lord Stowell in the Neutralitet.59 Sailing under a false destination or false papers
may possibly be called malignant or aggravating. There
is not only the knowledge of guilt, but an attempt to
evade its consequences. But in the case of the shipowner
who also owns the contraband on board his ship it is
difficult to see \vhere the malignancy or aggravation lies,
if it be not in the knowledge of the character of the goods
on board. If it be malignant or aggravating on the part
of the owner of the goods to consign them to the enemy,
it must be equally malignant and aggravating on the part
of the shipowner knowingly to aid in the transaction.
Nevertheless, it was this construction of Lord Stowell's
words in the Ringende Jacob 61 rather than the reasoning
on which his decision in the Neutralitet 62 case was based
that was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of the Bermuda. 63 In that case Chase,
C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says as to
the relaxation of the ancient rule: "It is founded on the
presumption that the contraband shipment was made
without the consent of the owner given in fraud of
belligerent rights, or, at least, without intent on his
part to take hostile part against the country of the
captors; and it must be recognized and enforced in all
cases \vhere that presumtion is not repelled by proof.
The rule, however, requires good faith on the part of the
neutral, and does not protect the ship where good faith
is \Vanting. * * * Mere consent to transportation
of contraband will not always or usually be taken to be a
violation of good faith. There must be circumstances
of aggravation. The nature of the contraband articles
and their importance to the belligerent, and the general
features of the transaction, must be taken into consideration in determining whether the neutral owner intended
or did not intend, by consenting to the transportation,
to mix in the war.''
e11 C. Rob. 89.

62

3 c. Rob. 295.

csa {1865) 3 \ValJ. 514, 555.
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Dutch view.

Italian view.

German view.
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Passing from the English and American decisions to
the views which were at the commencement of the present
hostilities entertained by the prize courts or jurists of
other nations, we find what at first sight appears to be
considerable divergence of opinion. If, however, the
t rue principle be that kno,vledge of the character of the
cargo is a sufficient ground for depriving a shipowner of
the benefit of the modern rule, this divergence is more
apparent than real. It reduces itself to a difference of
opinion as to the cirdumstances under which the knowledge may be inferred, and if it be remembered that
knowledge on the part of the shipowner of the character
of the cargo must be largely a matter of inference from a
great variety of circumstances, such difference of opinion
is readily intelligible.
Referring, for example, to the vie'v entertained in
Holland, their lordships find that, although the ship is
prima facie confiscable if an important part of the
cargo be contraband, proof that the master or the charterers could not have known the real nature of the cargo
'vill secure the ship's release. In other words, the proportion of the contraband to the whole cargo raises a
presumption of kno,vledge which may be rebutted .
. ~gain,
.
according to the vie,vs held in Italy, the ship
carrying contraband is liable to confiscation only 'vhere
the owner was a'vare that his vessel was in tended to be
used for the carrying of contraband. Here knowledge
is made the determining factor, the manner in which
knowledge is to be proved or inferred being left to the
general law. Again, according to the views entertained
in Germany, a ship carrying contraband can only be
confiscated if the o'vner or the charterer of the 'vhole
ship or the master kne'v or ought to have known that
there was contraband on board, and if that contraband
formed more than a quarter of the cargo. Here also
knowledge is made the determining factor, though there
is a concession to the neutral if the proportion of the
contraband to the whole cargo be sufficiently small.
Once more, in France the test of the right to confiscate
is whether or not the contraband is three-fourths in
value of the 'vhole cargo. This view may be looked on
as defining the circumstances in which an irrebuttable
inference of kno,vledge arises. The views entertained in
Russia and Japan are similarly explicable. In their
lordships' opinion the principle underlying all these

INTERNATIONAL LA'V: DECISIONS AND NOTES.

views is the same. There can be no confiscation of the
ship without knowledge on the part of the owner, or
possibly of the charterer or master, of the nature of the
cargo, but in some cases the inference as to knowledge
arising from the extent to which the cargo is contraband
can not be rebutted, while in others it can, and in some
cases, even where there is the requisite knowledge, the
contraband must bear a minimum proportion to the
whole cargo.
It follows that the views entertained by foreign nations
point to knowledge of the character of the goods being
alone sufficient for condemnation of a vessel for carrying
contraband; in other words, they support the principle
to be derived from the reasoning in the Neutralitet 14
rather than the principle which has been deduced from
the dictum in the Ringende Jacob 65 and developed in
the Bermuda.M It should be observed that both Westlake and Hall agree that knowledge is alone sufficient to
justi.fy confiscation. (See Westlake, International Law
(War), 2d ed., p. 291; Hall, International La,v, 6th ed.,
p. 666.)
Their lordships consider that in this state of the authorities they ought to hold thnt knowledge of the
character of the goods on the part of the owner of the
ship is sufficient to justify the condemnation of the shipat any rate, 'vhere the goods in question constitute a
substantial part of the whole cargo.
In the light of what has been said as to the rule of
international law their lordships will now proceed to consider the special facts of this case. The o\vners of the
ship are a Swedish firm carrying on business at Gothenburg. On January 8, 1916, they chartered the ship to
a German firm of fish dealers for u period of six 'veeks
from the time when the vessel 'vas placed at charterers'
disposal, "'~ith power for the charterers to prolong this
period up to May 16, 1916. The voyages undertaken by
the charterers 'vere to be from Scandinavian to German
Baltic ports. It must have been quite evident to the
owners that the ship 'vould be used for the importation
of fish into Germany. 1"'hey must also have known that
foodstuffs \Vere conditional contraband. It is almost
inconceivable that they did not also kno\v of the food
64
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difficulties in Germany and of the m anner in \Vhich the
German Government had in effect requisitioned salted
herrings to meet the exigencies of the \var.
They
had an opportunity in the court below· of establishing
their \vant of kno,vledge if it existed, but they did not
attempt to do so. The inference that they did in fact
lmo'v that the vessel 'vould be used for the purpose
for 'vhich it 'vas used is irresistible. If kno\vledge of the
character of the goods be the true criterion as to confiscability, the vessel 'vas rightly condemned.
Even on the hypothesis that something beyond mere
kno,vledge of the character of the ca.rgo is required, something 'vhich may be called "malignant or aggravating"
'vi thin the principles of the Ringende rlacob 67 or the
Ber·muda 68 decisions, that something clearly exists in
the present case. A shipo,vner who lets his ship on time
charter to an enemy dealer in conditional contraband for
the purposes of his trade at a. time 'vhen the conditional
contraband is vitally necessary to and has been reqpisitioned by the enemy government for the purpose of the
'\\rar is, in their lordships' opinion, deliberately ''taking
hostile part against the country of the captors" and
"mixing in the 'V~tr" 'vi thin the meaning of those expressions as used by Chase C. J. in the Bermuda. 68
In their lordships' opinion, the appeal fails and should
be dismissed 'vi th costs.
THE "BONNA."

ADMIRALTY.
(IN PRIZE.)

February 14, 15, 19, 1918.
[1918] p. 123.

In this case, " rhich governed a nu1nber of others, the
procurator general, on behalf of the Cro\vn, claimed the
condemnation of 416 tons of coconut oil seized at Bristol
on August 27, 1916, ex the Nor\vegian steamship Bonna.
The claimants, the Nya Margarin A/B. Svea, of Kaln1ar,
S\veden, claimed the release of the oil on the ground that
it had been bought by them for the purpose of the manufacture, in their own factory, of 1na.rgarine for sale and
consumptjon in S\veden.
6i
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